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The Search for 
Global Standards 
Idle words or constructive 
dialogue? Jayne Barnard 
comments on the OECD's 
Corporate Governance Project 
0  n 2 April 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) re- 
ceived a report from its Business Sector Advisory 
Group recommending that it commence drafting a set 
of global guidelines on the subject of corporate gover-
nance. The report — Corporate Governance: Improving 
Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets 
— was prepared by a team of distinguished executives 
headed by US lawyer Ira Millstein. The executives 
represented the management elite of Britain, France, 
Germany, the US and Japan. 
Already, the Advisory Group has become known 
as the six 'wise men' and already their report has been 
dismissed as `pointless' and, as an article in The Daily 
Telegraph puts it, indicative of the OECD's 'endless 
quest for things to do'. In fact, the Advisory Group 
report contains some valuable insights into the 'core 
principles' of good corporate governance, and also 
demonstrates some shrewd political thinking about 
how improvements in corporate governance can be 
achieved. 
The report itself is a model of diplomacy. On the 
one hand, it emphasises the primacy of shareholder 
interests over those of other constituencies. Without 
shareholder protection devices and a clearly stated 
commitment to permit businesses to seek long-term 
growth and profit, capital will not flow into a nation's 
economy. On the other hand, the report recognises that 
`corporations must function in the larger society' and 
sometimes shareholders' interests must give way to those 
of other constituencies. At times, the report concedes,  
businesses may need to submit themselves to 'broader 
collective objectives' than mere profit. 
Enforcing Standards 
This kind of accommodation is necessary when the 
member nations' experiences with corporate govern-
ance are so diverse. In the US, for example, the experi-
ence includes a highly regarded government regulator, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It also 
includes: a clear legal bias in favour of shareholders' 
interests; widespread use of shareholders' derivative 
suits; exacting standards for financial disclosure; out-
spoken — and organised — institutional investors; share-
holder suffrage on a one-share, one-vote basis; simplified 
proxy voting, available to all; access to the ballot under 
the SEC's 'shareholder proposal' rule; boards of direc-
tors comprised largely of independent outsiders; a tra-
dition of board committees with responsibility for audit, 
nomination, compensation, and compliance with the 
law; and a vigorous, probing business press. 
In Japan, France and Germany, by contrast, the 
national experience with corporate governance has been 
quite different. 'Other constituencies' receive far more 
deference in those countries than is customary in the 
US; the regulatory structures are less obtrusive; account-
ing standards are less demanding (and hardly uniform 
among neighbouring countries); the behavioural expec-
tations of directors are less well-defined; directors are 
seldom truly 'independent'; there is more 'patient capi-
tal' in the sense that non-arms-length investors may be 
willing to defer their gains, sometimes indefinitely; 
and (although this may be changing) the sense of 
shareholder entitlement and a need for protective 
mechanisms is less pronounced than in the US. 
The 'next tier' of OECD countries and other 
emerging economies, however, present the greatest 
challenge to creating uniform standards of corporate 
governance. In many of these countries, corporate 
governance practices can range from 
limitations on the number of shares 
an equity owner may own or vote; 
to refusal to accept proxy votes by 
mail; to physical intimidation of 
shareholders who appear at annual 
meetings! In most of these countries, 
one finds huge boards of 'neutered' 
directors who make no claim to in- 
dependent empowerment and, in 
fact, who seldom meet; vast cross- 
shareholdings and interlocking 
directorates; nepotism; cronyism; no tradition of board 
committees for important matters such as nominating, 
audit or compensation; compensation practices that 
bear no relationship to corporate performance; com-
plete subjugation of minority shareholders (including 
having no right to notice of shareholders' meetings); 
and a woeful lack of any meaningful financial disclosure. 
Though the Advisory Group report suggests that 
these differing experiences can be harmonised, largely 
through voluntary action, of course they cannot, at least 
any time soon. However, rather than despairing of the 
difficulties inherent in trying to force convergence in 
corporate governance norms, the Advisory Group report 
takes the wiser rack of attempting to reduce the 
principles of corporate governance to an irreducible 
minimum. A few changes must be required by 
governments; others must be made by business leaders 
in response to market demands. To a large degree, by 
staying at this level of abstraction, the Advisory Group 
succeeds in setting out a framework, and offering an 
exhortation, for the future evolution of global corporate 
governance standards. 
The Report's Strengths 
First, the overall principles stressed in the Advisory 
Group's report — fairness, transparency, accountability 
and responsibility — are surely desirable in any corporate 
governance environment, regardless of cultural or 
regulatory differences. The call for common accounting 
standards is essential in a global marketplace. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution can be found 
in the Advisory Group's treatment of boards of 
directors' practices and objectives. According to the 
report, every corporate board, regardless of the 
country in which it operates, and regardless of the 
legal structure to which it is confined, should share 
the following features: it should 
provide leadership in setting cor-
porate strategy; it should provide 
active oversight of management; 
its members should be independ-
ent of management; it should have 
control over the audit function 
and ensure that financial accounts 
are in order; it should control its 
own succession; it should assume 
responsibility for the company's 
compliance with the law; and its 
members should regularly engage in self-criticism and 
evaluation. 
Given these guidelines, the Advisory Group re-
port is clearly committed to building an 'independent 
board culture' in businesses throughout the world 
and that is admirable. Though observers may differ 
on who qualifies as truly 'independent', or on how 
independence should be enforced, or whether inde-
pendence even matters when it comes to the bottom 
line — to reduce strong corporate governance to its 
most essential core is to insist upon independence 
at the board of directors level. True reform is not 
about remedies, or specific forms of financial disclo-
sure, or mandatory audit committees, or the voting 
rights of pension funds. It is about the willingness 
of corporate directors to act independently, to en-
force ethical standards and to eliminate those 
executives who refuse to honour the board's direc-
tives. The Advisory Group delivers that message 
perfectly. 
The second key message then becomes obvious. 
For a corporate governance system to work effectively, 
it must keep in mind the legitimate concerns of in-
vestors. 'Shareholders require reasonable assurances 
that their assets will be protected against fraud, mana-
gerial or controlling shareholder self-dealing, and 
other [forms of] "insider" wrongdoing,' the Advi-
sory Group asserts. 'Policy makers ... should provide 
clear, consistent and enforceable securities and capi-
tal market regulations designed to protect shareholder 
rights.' 
To some extent, of course, shareholders will assert 
their own rights, or withhold their capital. Current 
activities in Asia make clear that where money is 
desperately needed, investors' demands for more pro-
tection can be accommodated by private agreement. 
The Advisory Group is wise, 
however, in suggesting that national 
governments be supportive of these 
efforts. It is even wiser to recognise 
that there is only so much that 
legislation can accomplish and that 
too much legislation, too inflexibly 
written, can be counter-productive 
and actually hinder corporate 
governance reform. 
The Advisory Group's report 
makes three additional contribu- 
tions, especially to the political discourse in 'adolescent' 
economies: (1) it states clearly that acceptable corpo-
rate governance practices can have a powerful impact 
on a nation's economy; (2) it reminds policy makers 
that capital suppliers throughout the world increasingly 
care about corporate governance issues; and (3) it 
suggests that, sometimes, a country must endure 'short-
term social costs' in order to achieve long-term 
economic success. All of these points need to be made 
— whether the OECD will prove a credible source for 
them (as opposed to, say, the IMF) is, of course, an-
other matter. 
The Road Ahead 
It now looks as if the OECD hierarchy will take up 
the call to draft global guidelines for corporate 
governance practices. In doing so, the organisation 
should seek to avoid one of the mistakes of the 
Advisory Group: investors themselves were not 
represented. One must wonder why, when at least 
three organisations representing international 
investors — the US Council of Institutional Investors, 
the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) and the Geneva-based International 
Corporate Governance Network — have already 
expressed their concerns about differing governance 
standards throughout the world, and are devising 
their own sets of 'best practices' guidelines to help 
them in making trans-boundary investment de-
cisions. To have excluded these voices, and the values 
they have expressed, from representation on the 
Advisory Group was surprising and unfortunate —
especially since the last time Ira Millstein went 
through an exercise like this in the US, he included 
representatives of three significant institutional 
investors among his task force members. These 
investors' views should receive 
close attention in further OECD 
actions. 
No one should imagine that 
national legislation or traditional 
business practices will change 
overnight, and if they do, it will 
have more to do with the demands 
of capital suppliers than the sug-
gestions of the OECD. Neverthe-
less, the Advisory Group's shaping 
of this issue, and its measured 
suggestions to national policy makers, can only be 
viewed as constructive and a help in accelerating the 
necessary reform process. 
